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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Jurisdiction is proper in the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code §78-2a-
3(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE NO. 1 
Did the Trial Court correctly award attorney's fees to the Appellee? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The appellate court will not overturn a trial court's award of attorney's fees absent 
a clear showing the trial court abused its discretion. Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438,442, 
444 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE 
This issue was preserved in proposed findings of fact and in post trial motions. (R. 
(R. 148, p. 9; R. 184, p. 6; R. 338, p. 5). 
ISSUE NO. 2 
Did the Trial Court err in signing the proposed order within four days after the same 
being filed with the court and served upon the Appellant? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Questions of law are reviewed for correctness according no deference to the trial 
court's legal conclusions. Bearden v. Wardley Corp.. 72 P.3d 144 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE 
This issue was preserved in post trial motions. (R. 270, p. 4). 
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ISSUE NO. 3 
Did the Trial Court err in its division and valuation of the marital residence? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Factual determinations made by a court are reviewed under a clearly erroneous 
standard. Kunz v. Dept. of Transportation, 949 P.2d 763 (Utah 1997); Rule 52(a), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The standard of review of a trial court's division of property in a 
divorce case is "an abuse of discretion." Hall v. Hall. 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE 
This issue was preserved in oral argument and in post trial motions. (R. 421, p. 44, 
12 -23 ; R. 421, p. 45,20-25, - p.49; R. 421, p. 8, 17-25, - p. 9, 1-7). 
ISSUE NO. 4 
Did the trial court err in awarding the Appellee a portion of the Appellant's inheritance? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Factual determinations made by a court are reviewed under a clearly erroneous 
standard. Kunz v. Dept. of Transportation. 949 P.2d 763 (Utah 1997); Rule 52(a), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The standard of review of a trial court's division of property in a 
divorce case is "an abuse of discretion." Hall v. Hall. 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE 
This issue was preserved in oral argument and in post trial motions. (R148, p.5; R. 
421, p. 33,6-16; R. 421, p. 95, 7-25; R. 421, p. 96,1-14; R. 421, p. 98,2-9; R. 184, p. 5). 
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ISSUE NO. 5 
Did The Trial Court Err In Its Division Of Certain Items Of Personal Property And Debt 
Between The Parties? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Factual determinations made by a court are reviewed under a clearly erroneous 
standard. Kunz v. Dept. of Transportation, 949 P.2d 763 (Utah 1997); Rule 52(a), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The standard of review of a trial court's division of property in a 
divorce case is "an abuse of discretion." Hall v. Hall. 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE 
This issue was preserved in oral argument and in post trial motions. (R. 421, p. 66, 
14-20; R148, p. 4, 5, 6,7; R. 148, p. 6; R. 421, p. 95,11-17; R. 421, p.96,1-6; R. 184, p.5; 
R. 148, p.6, 7; R. 421, p. 92, 18 - p . 93,15; R. 421, p. 92, 18 - p . 93,15; R. 421, R. 338, 
P-5). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES 
AND RULES 
Utah Constitution Art. 1, §7 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h 
Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 26(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. NATURE OF THE CASE 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
This is an appeal from a final Order and Judgments of the Fifth District Court of 
Utah, Washington County, State of Utah, Honorable James L. Shumate, and related 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, entered on November 21, 2005, relating to the 
division of marital and separate property, division of marital debt, award of alimony, and 
award of attorneys fees and costs. 
2. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. The Appellee and Appellant were married on August 20, 1960, in Dalton, 
Massachusetts. (R. 303, p. 2). 
B. The parties separated on March 12, 2004 when the Appellee moved from 
the martial home. This was two days after the Appellant underwent heart surgery. (R. 
303, p. 2 - 3; R421, p.79, 1; R. 148, p. 2). 
C. After the Appellee moved from the marital home, she returned while the 
Appellant was absent and removed all documents and other items from a filing cabinet in 
the home. The majority of such documents were the personal property of the Appellant 
were not marital documents. Additionally, the Appellee removed $400.00 in cash from 
such filing cabinet. (R. 148, p.6). 
D. A Bifurcated Decree of Divorce was entered on July 28, 2004. (R. 43). 
E. Temporary Orders were entered on August 10,2004, which among other 
things 
i. Awarded the Appellee $ 1,500.00 per month as temporary alimony, 
ii. Awarded the Appellee the temporary use and possession of the home 
and furnishings. 
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iii. Awarded the Appellee the temporary use and possession of the 1997 
Cadillac Deville and the Appellant temporary use and possession of the 2000 GMC 
Truck. 
iv. Awarded the Appellee a lump sum support payment of $5,000.00. 
v. Awarded each party one-half of the Exxon Retirement Portion of an 
American Funds account; and 
vi. Ordered the Appellant to maintain the Appellee on his health, 
medical, dental and optical insurance and submit the costs thereof to the Court at the time 
of trial. (R.49;R. 148, p.2). 
F. As a result of the split of the Exxon Retirement account under the Court's 
August 10, 2004 Temporary Order, the Appellee and Appellant were each awarded funds 
of approximately $125,000.00. (R. 49; R. 421, p. 26, 24-25; R. 148, p. 3). 
G. The issues at trial involved the Appellee's claim for alimony and the 
division of marital assets consisting of a home located at 1020 East Fort Pierce Drive, St. 
George, Utah, furniture and household furnishings, vehicles, and certain accounts. (R. 
421 p. 3,24-25, p. 8, 3-5; R148, p. 3). 
H. The Appellee presented evidence at trial attempting to establish that the 
Appellant had engaged in an extramarital affair. Such evidence was disputed and rebutted 
by the Appellant and the court found no evidence that an extramarital affair had occurred. 
(R. 421, p.70 - p. 89,1-7; R. 148, p. 3). 
I. At the time of trial the Appellee testified that she received the sum of 
$635.00 per month from Social Security and $180.73 per month from her retirement plan. 
9 
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(R. 421, p.8, 8-14; Trial Exhibit 2;). She later testified at a post trial hearing that her 
social security was reduced by $75.00 a month. (R. 422, p.5, 19-25, p.6, 1-12). 
J. The Appellee alleged that her monthly expenses exceeded her current 
income by $2,489.16. (R. 421, p. 10, 20-25; R. 148, p. 3). 
K. The Appellant receives $1,200.00 per month from Social Security. The 
Appellant also works as a real estate agent. During 2004, the Appellant received gross 
commissions from real estate sales in the amount of $47,276.43. Of these commissions, 
the Appellant received more than half of such commissions ($27,600.00) from one sale of 
a commercial property. This sale was an unusual event and a one-time occurrence. From 
January 1, 2005 until the date of trial, March 1,2005, the Appellant had received on 
commission the amount of $1,018,12. Thus, the normal average gross commissions 
earned by the Appellant from January 1, 2004 through March 1,2005 is $1,476.06 per 
month.(R421,p. 11, 10-13; p. 12, 1-10; p. 22, 20-24; R. 148, p. 3-4). 
L. In earning commissions, the Appellant is required to pay certain business 
expenses. Evidence presented by the Appellant reflected the payment of business 
expenses and taxes in an amount of at least $23,182.60. (R. 421, p. 12, 5-10; R. 421, p. 
39, 6-18; Trial Exhibit 19). Thus, the expenses incurred by the Appellant in the operation 
of his business exceed his normal average gross commissions by $2,488.05. If the one-
time commission of $27,600.00 is added to determine net income, the Appellant's net 
income would only average $1,245.58 per month. (R. 148, p.4). 
M. In conducting his business the Appellant has formed a "Team" with other 
real estate agents in his office. Such an arrangement is informal and allows the team 
10 
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members to assist each other and divide commissions accordingly. (R. 421, p. 66, 14-20; 
R148, p. 4). 
N. The parties both maintain bank accounts into which their Social Security 
and retirement income is deposited. (R148, p. 4). 
O. In conducting his business activities, the Appellant maintains accounts at 
State Bank of Southern Utah. Such accounts hold funds deposited by the Appellant and 
other Team members and funds derived from the real estate efforts of the Appellant and 
other Team members. (R. 148, p.5; R. 184, p. 3). 
P. During the term of the marriage the parties each received an inheritance as a 
result of the death of their parents. (R. 421, p. 36, 3-8; Trial Exhibit #7; Trial Exhibit #25; 
R. 148, p. 5). 
Q. The Appellee received cash inheritance and General Electric Stock. The 
Appellee deposited all cash received by her as inheritance into a separate account and 
informed the Appellant that such sums were the Appellee's. At Trial, the Appellee 
alleged that she had spent all of the cash received by her as inheritance. (R148, p.5). 
R. The Appellant received cash inheritance of approximately $80,000.00 and 
certain items of household furnishings. The Appellant's inheritance was put into an 
account with American Funds. The Appellee demanded that such sums be placed into an 
account in both of the parties5 names for estate planning purposes. However, at all times, 
the Appellant exercised exclusive control over such funds, the parties treated the funds as 
Appellant's separate funds, the Appellee made no withdrawals from or otherwise dealt 
with the Appellant's inheritance account, and the Appellant exclusively determined for 
11 
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what purpose such funds would be used. (R148, p.5; Trial Exhibit #7; Trial Exhibit #25; 
R. 421, p. 33, 6-16; R. 421, p. 95, 7-25; R. 421, p. 96, 1-14; R. 421, p. 98, 2-9; R. 184, p. 
5) 
S. The Appellant used $ 10,000.00 from his inheritance to pay toward the 
purchase of the 1997 Cadillac Deville. The Appellant also used his inheritance funds to 
purchase a 2000 GMC truck. (R. 148, p. 6; Trial Exhibit #25; R. 421, p. 95, 11-17; R. 
421,p.96,1-6; R. 184, p.5). 
T. After the separation and divorce of the parties, the Appellee was involved in 
a traffic accident which totaled the Cadillac Deville. The Appellee subsequently 
purchased, in her own name, a 2002 Toyota Camry. The Appellee made no 
reimbursement to the Appellant for the funds from the Appellant's inheritance used to 
purchase the Cadillac Deville and did not credit the Appellant with any funds received 
from insurance on account of the damage to the vehicle. (R. 148, p.6). 
U. As part of his inheritance, the Appellant received a bed, dresser, 2 bedroom 
end tables, coffee table, 2 living room end tables, lamp table, crystal lamp, large mirror, 
marble top table, 2 blue chairs, and a chair used by the parties in their master bathroom. 
(R. 148, p.6). 
V. After the parties' separation, the Appellant paid to or for the benefit of the 
Appellee, the sum of $6,685.85. The majority of this expense was to pay for medical 
insurance premiums and expenses, payment of credit card expenses incurred by the 
Appellee, payment of auto insurance covering the Cadillac in the possession of the 
12 
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Appellee, and to put money into a joint account after the Appellee had depleted the funds 
in the account. (R. 148, p.6; Trial Exhibit 23; Trial Exhibit 24). 
W. After the parties' separation and until the date of judgment, the Appellant 
paid insurance premiums of $840.00 to maintain medical insurance solely on the 
Appellee. Additionally, the Appellant was required to pay $1,477.19 in co-pay amounts 
for services rendered to the Appellee. (R. 421, p. 92, 18 - p. 93, 15), Such payments were 
necessary due to the Court's August 10, 2004 temporary order and so as not to jeopardize 
the Appellant's own coverage. (R. 148, p.7). 
X. Between August 10, 2004 and the date of trial, the Appellant paid the 
Appellee $18,500.00 in temporary alimony. (R. 148, p.7). 
Y. The Appellee is 64 years of age and suffers from several health problems. 
While this may limit her ability to work, it does not deprive her of such ability. (R. 421, p. 
18, 9 - p. 21, 22; Trial Exhibit #6 ; R. 421, p.43, 6-16; R. 148, p.7). 
Z. The Appellant is 67 years of age and works as a real estate agent. The 
Appellant suffers from several health problems, including heart problems, which have, 
and will, affect his ability to work. His doctor has advised him that he should cut back on 
his activities, including employment. (R421, p. 11, 22-25; R. 421, p. 22, 16 - p . 26, 4; R. 
148, p.7). 
AA. At the time the parties purchased the marital home, each party withdrew 
$8,000.00 from accounts holding funds each had inherited and used such funds toward 
the purchase of the home. (R. 148, p. 8; R. 184, p. 4). 
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BB. At trial, the Appellee presented expert testimony from an appraiser 
regarding the value of the marital home. The Appellant objected to such evidence being 
presented as the identity, opinion, and basis of the opinion of the expert witness had not 
been previously disclosed by the Appellee to the Appellant. The Court overruled the 
objection as to the expert's testimony and allowed the appraiser to testify but did not 
admit the appraisal report into evidence. (R. 421, p. 44, 12 - 23; R. 421, p. 45, 20 - 25, -
p.49; R. 421, p. 8, 17-25, - p. 9, 1-7). 
CC. The Court also heard testimony from the Appellant, a real estate agent, and 
another real estate agent who works with the Appellant, as to the value of the home. Both 
testified that the home was worth between $209,000.00 and $215,000.00. (R. 421, p. 51 -
p. 56;R.421,p.45, 1). 
DD. There exists a debt on the home in the amount of $82,042.71. (R. 303, p. 8; 
Trial Exhibit #12). 
EE. No evidence was presented at trial nor was any claim asserted at trial by 
Appellee that the Appellant should pay the GM credit card expense. (R. 421, R. 338, p. 
5). 
FF. The parties have no minor children as issue of this marriage. (R. 303, p.3). 
GG. After trial on this matter, the parties submitted proposed findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and judgments. (R. 144, R. 148, and R. 161). 
HH. Several months later, the Appellant filed a motion with the Court to 
terminate the award of temporary alimony to the Appellee. This motion was based upon 
14 
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certain health problems experienced by the Appellant which limited his ability to work. 
(R. 242). 
II. The Court set a hearing on Appellant's motion to terminate alimony. 
However, due to a conflict in timing, the Appellant obtained a verbal agreement from the 
Appellee to continue the hearing and filed a motion and order to continue with the Court. 
The hearing was not set for a resolution of the parties' proposed findings. (R. 270 p. 1-2, 
5). 
KK. On the original date set for the hearing, the Appellee appeared and 
requested that the matter go forward as no order continuing the hearing had been entered. 
The Court denied the Appellant's motion to terminate alimony, (R. 422, p. 3, 16-21). took 
a proffer of evidence as to the Appellee's then claimed income, (R. 422, p.5, 23-25 and 
p.6 1-5) edited, at the bench, a draft of the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
law, (R. 422, p.7, 19-23) and awarded the Appellee judgment against the Appellant in 
accordance with the Appellee's request. This hearing was not noticed up for a resolution 
of the proposed Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law. (R. 422, R. 270, p. 5). 
LL. The Appellant filed a motion to reconsider with the Court. A hearing was 
held thereon, after which the Court modified to some degree the prior Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. These modifications formed the basis for the final Order and 
Judgments. (R. 270 and R. 423). 
MM. The Appellee mailed the final proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Order and Judgments to Appellant on November 17, 2005. (R. 303 and R. 
328). 
15 
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NN. Four days after the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order and 
Judgments were mailed to the Appellant, the Court entered the same. (R. 303. and R. 
328). 
0 0 . The Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on December 20,2005. (R. 348). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Issue No. 1 
The Trial Court failed to make a finding as to the Appellant's expenses and his 
ability to pay attorney's fees. The Trial Court also failed to take into account the 
Appellant's own attorney's fees. The Trial Court erred in awarding the Appellee her 
attorney's fees when she received ample assets from the marital estate to satisfy her own 
attorney's fees where there was no finding of bad faith. 
Issue No. 2 
The Trail Court entered the final Order and Judgments just four days after it was 
filed and served upon the Appellant, thus denying the Appellant due process and violated 
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Issue No. 3 
The Trial Court allowed the testimony of the Appellee's appraiser when he was 
never disclosed prior to the morning of trial as required by Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The Trial Court should have valued the house higher than $185,000.00 
given the fact that the market was "hot" and the Appellant and his witness, both real 
estate agents testified that the house would sell between $209,000 and $215,000.00. 
16 
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Issue No. 4 
The Trial Court erred in finding that the Appellant's inheritance was commingled 
and lost his identity wherein the inherited funds were deposited into a joint account that 
only the Appellant exercised control over. 
Issue No. 5 
The Trial Court erred in awarding an account that the Appellant shared with his 
other team members in his real estate business, ordering the Appellant to pay the debt to 
the GMC Credit Card, awarding half of the value of the 2000 GMC truck to the Appellee 
and not awarding half of the value of the 2002 Toyota Camry or the insurance proceeds 
from the wreck of the 1997 Cadillac Deville. 
ARGUMENTS 
Issue No. 1 
Did The Trial Court Correctly Award Attorney's Fees To The Appellee? 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3 allows for the award of attorney's fees in a divorce 
action. However, unless the action is an enforcement action where substantially prevailed 
on the merits is the standard, the court must look at the parties' ability to pay in 
determining whether an award of attorney's fees is appropriate or not. 
In Wilde v. Wilde, the Utah Supreme Court stated, "A trial court may award costs 
and attorney fees in divorce and modification proceedings. See Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3 
(1995), Crockett v.Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 821 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Both the decision 
to award attorney fees and the amount of such fees are within the trial court's sound 
discretion. See Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 839 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). However, 'the 
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award [or denial of such fees] must be based on evidence of the financial need of the 
receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the 
requested fees/ Bell v. Bell 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Failure to consider 
these factors is grounds for reversal on the fee issue. See Marshall v. Marshall 915 P.2d 
508, 517 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)." Wilde v. Wilde. 969 P.2d 438, 444 (Utah 1998). 
The appellate court will not overturn a trial court's award of attorney's fees absent 
a clear showing the trial court abused its discretion. Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 442, 
444 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
The Trial Court did make the following findings related to the award of attorney's 
fees in its Order and Judgments, "The Appellee has incurred costs and attorney fees 
herein in the sum of Fifteen Thousand Two Hundred Fifty-seven Dollars Sixty-nine Cents 
($ 15,257.69), through trial. The Appellee borrowed Three Thousand Five Hundred 
Dollars ($3,500.00), form her son to pay a retainer to her counsel at the commencement 
of this action. The Appellee's counsel submitted an Attorney's Affidavit specifying the 
service performed and the charges therefore. The Attorney fees the Appellee agreed to 
pay is $175.00 per hour plus the costs of the case. The hourly rate is reasonable in light of 
the circumstances of this case and the fees of other experienced lawyers in the community 
and the services performed for the Appellee by her counsel were reasonable and 
necessary. The Appellee does not have the ability to compensate her counsel and the 
Appellant has the ability to pay the Appellee's costs and attorney fees from his 
employment and other income and other assets. The Appellant should be ordered to pay 
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the Appellee's costs and attorney fees incurred herein in the sum of $10,000.00... ." (R. 
303,p.l3). 
In marshaling the evidence that supports this finding, the Appellee's net monthly 
income was found to be $742.73. (R. 422, p.5, 19-25, p.6, 1-12). The Appellee's also 
testified at trial that her monthly need was $3,304.89. Thus, her monthly shortfall before 
the alimony award is $2,489.16. (R. 421, p. 10, 20-25; R. 148, p. 3). Appellant was 
ordered to pay $1,000.00 per month as alimony. (R. 303, p. 7). The Court also found that 
the Appellant was able to earn $2,500.00 per month. (R. 303, p. 7). The Court did not 
make a finding as to the Appellant's monthly expenses and his ability to pay spousal 
support or attorney's fees. Both parties were awarded $125,000.00 in division of 
retirement funds and the Appellee was awarded half the equity in the marital home plus 
$8,000.00. (R. 303, p. 8,10). 
The Appellee received ample assets to satisfy her own attorney's fee award. It was 
not equitable for the Court to award the Appellee her attorney's fees when the Appellant 
had incurred his own attorney's fees as well that the Court did not take into account when 
deciding to award attorney's fees. The Court also failed to take into account the 
Appellant's own expenses in determining the Appellant's ability to pay attorney's fees. 
For these reasons, this issue should be overturned and/or remanded for further findings. 
ISSUE NO. 2 
Did The Trial Court Err In Signing The Proposed Order Within Four Days After The 
Same Being Filed With The Court And Served Upon The Appellant? 
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1 
The Utah Constitution states, "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
I 
property, without due process of law." Utah Constitution Art. 1, §7. 
Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth, "Unless the court 
approves the proposed order submitted with an initial memorandum, or unless otherwise 
directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after the court's 
decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's 
decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. 
The party preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an 
objection or upon expiration of the time to object.'' 
Questions of law are reviewed for correctness according no deference to the trial 
court's legal conclusions. Bearden v. Wardlev Corp., 72 P.3d 144 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
The Court entered the final Order and Judgments and Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law just four days after service. The Court did not order any time frame 
different than the five day provision contained in Rule 7. This was also not an order 
submitted based upon the initial memorandum. This is a clear error and should be 
reversed. 
ISSUE NO. 3 
Did The Trial Court Err In Its Division And Valuation Of The Marital Residence? 
The Trial Court erred in its division and valuation of the marital residence by allowing 
the testimony of the Appellee's appraiser, when he was not disclosed until the morning of 
trial and by ignoring the Appellant's $8,000.00 contribution from inherited funds towards the 
purchase of the marital residence. 
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Rule 26(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, "A party shall disclose to other 
parties the identity of any person who may be used at trial to present evidence under Rules 
702, 703 or 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence." Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure effective until May 2, 2005. 
Questions of law are reviewed for correctness according no deference to the trial 
court's legal conclusions. Bearden v. Wardley Corp., 72 P.3d 144 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
Factual determinations made by a court are reviewed under a clearly erroneous 
standard. Kunz v. Dept. of Transportation, 949 P.2d 763 (Utah 1997); Rule 52(a), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The standard of review of a trial court's division of property in a 
divorce case is "an abuse of discretion." Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
In marshalling the evidence, the Appellee's expert witness testified that the marital 
home was worth $185,000.00. The Appellee testified that she thought the house was worth 
$175,000.00. The home also had a debt against it in the amount of $82,042.71. The Appellee 
also testified that she used $8,000.00 of her inheritance to purchase the home. The Court 
valued the house at $ 185,000.00 and awarded the Appellee one half of the equity in the house 
plus $8,000.00 for her contribution from her inheritance. 
However, the Court ignored the fact that the Appellant also contributed $8,000.00 
from his inheritance and that he testified as a real estate agent that the house was worth 
$215,000.00 and he had another real estate agent testify that the house was worth 
approximately $209,000.00. In addition to the difference in testimony as to the value of the 
house, the Appellant objected to the Appellee's expert witness because he was never 
disclosed as an expert witness and his appraisal was never provided to the Appellant prior to 
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trial. The Court overruled the Appellant's objection and allowed the testimony, but would not 
allow the appraisal report. The Court should not have allowed the expert witness testimony 
pursuant to Rule 26(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See also Stevenett v. Wal-Mart 
Stores. Inc.. (Utah 1999). 
The Court should have not allowed the testimony of the Appellee's appraiser and 
should have given more weight and consideration to the testimony of the Appellant and his 
witness because of their experience in the field. The Court erred in allowing the appraiser's 
testimony and then in using the appraiser's valuation as the valuation for the marital 
residence. 
Had the trial court not allowed the appraiser's testimony, then the court would have 
had to weigh the Appellee's value of $175,000.00 versus the Appellant's value of 
$215,000.00 together with his agent's value of $209,000.00. The Appellant's value of the 
house should be given more weight because he works in the field and St. George was 
admittedly a "hot market". (R. 421, p. 6, 3-8). 
The Trial Court should have also considered the Appellant's contribution of 
$8,000.00 from his inheritance as part of the equation and awarded the Appellant one-half 
of the equity plus $8,000.00 just like the Appellee. Because both parties contributed 
$8,000.00 of pre-marital funds toward the house, the equity in the house should simply be 
divided in half. The value of the house should have been higher than $185,000.00 
The Trial Court also prevented the Appellant from accessing his half of the value 
of the house by giving the Appellee a life estate in the house. This does not seem 
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equitable when the Appellee received over half of the marital estate, and a $1,000.00 a 
month award of alimony. 
ISSUE NO. 4 
Did The Trial Court Err In Awarding The Appellee A Portion Of The Appellant's 
Inheritance? 
Inheritance is considered separate property and only awarded to the other party if 
there is a commingling of the inheritance to the point where the inheritance loses its separate 
identity. Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988). 
Factual determinations made by a court are reviewed under a clearly erroneous 
standard. Kunz v. Dept. of Transportation, 949 P.2d 763 (Utah 1997); Rule 52(a), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The standard of review of a trial court's division of property in a 
divorce case is "an abuse of discretion." Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
In marshalling the evidence, the Appellee stated that the American Funds Account 
was a joint account. The Appellant testified that he received $31, 000.00 in an 
inheritance. The Appellant deposited these funds into a joint account. The Appellant used 
this account to purchase the 2003 GMC pick up and titled the pick up in their joint names. 
The Appellant also deposited his earnings into this account. (R. 161, p. 5). 
The Appellant does not dispute that the account was a joint account, but he can 
trace $32,045.00 to inherited funds. (Trial Exhibit #7). This amount should be taken out 
of the account as the Appellant's sole and separate property, unless the court awarded the 
two vehicles purchases out of the funds from this account as the Appellant's sole and 
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separate property. The Appellant should not lose his inheritance simply because he 
placed it into a joint account where the Appellee exercised no control over the account. 
Issue No. 5 
Did The Trial Court Err In Its Division Of Certain Items Of Personal Property And Debt 
Between The Parties? 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5 states, "When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court 
may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, 
and parties." Generally, in a divorce proceeding, each party is presumed to be entitled to 
all of his or her separate property and 50% of the marital property. Bradford v. Bradford, 
993 P.2d 887 (Utah 1999). Overriding consideration in property division is that ultimate 
division be equitable, that is, that property be fairly divided between parties given their 
contributions during marriage and their circumstances at time of divorce. Each party is 
presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate property and 50% of marital property. 
Dunn v.Dunn 802 P.2d 1314, (Utah 1990). 
Factual determinations made by a court are reviewed under a clearly erroneous 
standard. Kunz v. Dept. of Transportation, 949 P.2d 763 (Utah 1997); Rule 52(a), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The standard of review of a trial court's division of property in 
a divorce case is "an abuse of discretion." Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). 
The Trial Court erred in the following division of the marital property and debts: 
A. State Bank of Southern Utah Account: 
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The Appellee presented evidence that this account was the Appellant's sole 
account and he alone used the account. (R. 161, p. 4). This evidence was presented in the 
Appellee's Objection to the Appellant's proposed Findings of Fact and was not stated at 
trial. The Appellant specifically stated that these funds were part of his real estate's teams 
funds and that they shared the account. (R. 148, p.5; R. 184, p. 3). The Trial Court was 
not presented enough evidence to determine that the State Bank of Southern Utah 
Account was the Appellant's sole account. 
B. GMC Credit Card: 
The only evidence presented at trial about the GMC Credit Card was Appellee's 
Exhibit #13. There were no statements that this debt should have been awarded to the 
Appellant and why. If the Court found that the debt was a marital debt, which it did not 
make such finding, then why did it not award the debt to both parties equally. The Court 
should not have made a finding that the Appellant was responsible for the GMC Credit 
Card. 
C. 2000 GMC Truck: 
The Court awarded the Appellee one-half of the value of the 2000 GMC Truck 
even though the Appellant purchased the vehicle with money from his account wherein 
he placed his inheritance. (R. 303, p.l 1). The Appellee presented evidence that the 
account was a joint account and that the Appellant placed his earnings into the account. 
(R. 161, p.4). However, the Appellant was the only one who exercised control over the 
account and could trace over $32,000.00 from the account as his separate property 
through inheritance. (R. 184, p. 5). 
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D. 2002 Toyota Camry: 
The Trial Court failed to place a value on the Toyota Camry, but simply awarded it 
and the associated obligation to the Appellee. (R. 303, p. 12). The Court divides the 
equity in the Appellant's 2000 GMC Pick Up, but does not divide the Appellee's Camry. 
This issue should be remanded for further findings and then equally divided. 
E. Insurance Proceeds on 1997 Cadillac Deville: 
The Trial Court ignored that after separation the Appellee wrecked the 1997 
Cadillac Deville, the Appellant's separate asset or at the very least a marital asset, and 
used the insurance proceeds for her own benefit. (R. 148, p. 6). The Appellee presented 
evidence that the monies used to purchase the 1997 Cadillac Deville were taken from the 
parties' joint account and the vehicle was titled in both the parties' names. (R. 161, p.6). 
However, this does not discount the fact that at the very least the insurance proceeds in 
marital property and should have been equally divided. The Appellant did testify that the 
Cadillac Deville was purchased with separate funds acquired through inheritance. (R. 
148, p.6). 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons the Court should overturn the award of attorney's fees, remand 
the final Order and Judgments because the Court failed to follow due process and Rule 7 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, find that the appraiser's testimony should have been 
excluded and the house valued between $209,000 and $215,000.00 and divided 
immediately, overturn the trial court's ruling that the Appellant's inherited funds were 
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commingled, and overturn the trial court's division of the marital estate in that it was not 
equitable. 
DATED this / 3 day of July? 2006. 
Attorneys for Appellant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Order and Judgments 
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ANDREW B. BERRY, JR. USB #0309 
Attorney for Judith Wanda Lowry 
39 West Main Street 
Post Office Box 600 
Moroni, Utah 84646-0600" 
Telephone: 435 436-8200 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WASHINGTON "COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
JUDITH WANDA LOWRY, : . ORDER AND JUDGMENTS • 
Petitioner, : 
vs. : Civil No. 044500246 
KENNETH RAY LOWRY, : Assigned to: 
Honorable James L. Shumate 
Respondent. : 
ooOoo 
This action came on for a regularly scheduled trial on 
the 1st day of March, 2005, before the Honorable James L. Shumate, 
of the Fifth Judicial District Court for Washington County within 
the State of Utah. The Petitioner and the Respondent were present 
and represented by their counsel, Andrew B. Berry, Jr., and Gary G. 
Kuhlmann, respectively. The parties presented their documentary 
evidence and witnesses and the Court examined the Petitioner and 
the Respondent. The Petitioner and the Respondent each presented 
proposed findings of fact, orders and judgments to the Court and 
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filed objections thereto. THE COURT, upon the pleadings on file 
herein, the witnesses and documentary evidence presented by the 
parties and having made and entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and with good cause appearing therefore, hereby 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES: 
1. The Petitioner is hereby awarded temporary spousal 
support which should be paid by the Respondent in the sum One 
Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00), each month on the 1st day of each 
month hereafter and commencing November 1, 2005. Because the 
finding upon the Respondent's income is temporary, either party may 
bring this issue back to the Court by motion, rather than by 
petition. 
2. The Petitioner and the Respondent purchased a 
residence and real property in October, 2002, and during the 
marriage situate at 1020 East Fort Pierce Drive in the City of St. 
George in the County of Washington within the State of Utah. 
The fair market value of the parties' residence and real 
property as of February 24, 2005, was One Hundred Eighty-five 
Thousand Dollars ($185,000.00). Accordingly, the parties have just 
less than One Hundred Three Thousand Dollars ($103,000.00), of 
equity in the marital residence and real property. The Petitioner 
paid Eight . Thousand Dollars ($8,000.00), from her separate 
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inherited funds toward the purchase of the marital residence and 
real property. 
The Petitioner is awarded the ownership and all right, 
title and interest in and to said residence and real property 
subject to the Respondent's lien for his share of the .equity 
therein in the sum of Forty-seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($47,500.00). The Respondent shall forthwith quit claim the 
ownership and all right, title and interest therein to the 
Petitioner. The Petitioner shall pay the payments and the 
outstanding debt to U.S. Bank on the residence and real property.' 
The Petitioner shall live in the marital residence and real 
property until she dies, or sells the marital residence and real 
property. The sale of the marital residence and real property 
shall be in the Petitioner's sole discretion. The Petitioner shall 
not be required to pay the Respondent's equity lien upon the 
marital residence and real property until she sells the residence 
and real property, or re-marries. In the event Petitioner chooses 
not to sell the residence and real property during her lifetime and 
the Respondent dies prior to the payment of his equity lien, said 
equity lien shall become an asset of the Respondent's estate. 
3. The Respondent has in his possession marital property 
which he took with him at the time of separation. These items 
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include a refrigerator, television, chest of drawers, laptop 
computer, lounging chairs, a green desk, the barometer, a crystal 
chandelier, golf clubs, fishing gear, camping gear, 2 shop vacuums, 
saws, drills and several other tools, all purchased during the 
marriage. He also has weapons which were purchased during the 
marriage including 3 rifles, a revolver and reloading equipment. 
The Petitioner nor the Respondent made any claim for personal 
•property in the possession of the other at the time of trial. The 
Petitioner and the Respondent acquired household furniture, 
fixtures, furnishings and appliances and other personal property 
during their marriage which have been divided between the parties 
and which are awarded pursuant to this division. 
4. Each party should be awarded his or her personal 
effects. 
5. The Respondent acquired pension, retirement and stock 
benefits during the parties' marriage which are presently held by 
American Funds. The Petitioner and the Respondent are each awarded 
the ownership of one-half (H), of all pension, retirement and IRA 
funds and accounts. These funds have not yet been divided although 
the Petitioner's counsel has submitted a Domestic Relations Order 
for execution by the Court. The Respondent shall forthwith execute 
all documents necessary to effectuate the division of the American 
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Funds Accounts specifically, but not limited to, an ' IRA 
Distribution Request form provided to the Respondent's counsel by 
the Petitioner's counsel on January 4, 2005, which requires the 
Respondent's signature guarantee in Section 7. The guaranteed 
signature of the Respondent is required before American Funds - can 
distribute the Respondent's pension and retirement IRAs, and he 
shall do so forthwith. 
6. The Respondent deposited into' a separate American 
Funds account approximately $32,045.00, which he inherited from his 
father in 1999. The Respondent and the Petitioner- created this 
account with American Funds in joint tenancy. The funds in this 
account have been commingled and have not remained the separate 
property of the Respondent and are marital property. The American 
Funds accounts shall be equally divided between the Respondent and 
the Petitioner and the provisions of paragraph 5, of this Order and 
the Domestic Relations Order shall apply to the distribution of all 
of the said American Funds accounts. 
7. In November 2003, the Respondent purchased a 2000 GMC 
Extended Cab 4x4 pickup truck which he paid for in full. No loan 
obligation or other liens exist against this vehicle. The truck is 
titled in the names of the Respondent and the Petitioner. The 
present NADA value of this marital asset exceeds $22,000.00. The 
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Respondent has also added a satellite radio, tool box, fancy wheels 
and running boards to this vehicle the value of whiclh is $1,000.00. 
The Respondent shall forthwith pay the Petitioner and she is 
awarded judgment against the Respondent in the sum of Eleven 
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($11,500.00), which is one-half (**) , 
of the value of the 2000 GMC Extra Cab 4x4 pickup truck. 
8. The Petitioner purchased a 2002 Toyota Camry after 
the parties' separation because an accident, not the fault of the 
Petitioner, totaled the 1997 Cadillac DeVille driven by the 
Petitioner at the time of separation. This motor vehicle is titled 
solely in the Petitioner's name. The Petitioner owes nearly 
$7,000.00, to Box Elder Credit Union upon the 2002 Toyota Camry and 
her monthly payment thereon is $129.68, per month. The ownership 
and all right, title and interest in 2002 Toyota Camry, acquired 
after the parties' separation by the Petitioner, is awarded to her 
and she is ordered to pay the debt thereupon. 
9. The Respondent is ordered to forthwith pay the debt 
to the GM credit card in the sum of $4,282.73. 
10. The Petitioner and the Respondent are each awarded 
one-half (H) , of the value of the accounts at Southern Utah State 
Bank and Zions Bank and all other accounts existing at the time of 
the hearing upon the Order to Show Cause. The Respondent shall 
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forthwith pay the Petitioner her one-half (^) , share of these 
accounts and the Petitioner shall be awarded judgment against the 
Respondent therefore. 
11. The Petitioner has incurred costs and attorney fees 
herein in the sum of Fifteen Thousand Two Hundred Fifty-seven 
Dollars Sixty-nine Cents($15,257.69) , through trial. The Respondent 
is ordered to forthwith pay the Petitioner's costs and attorney 
fees incurred herein in the sum of $10,000.00', and she is awarded 
judgment against the Respondent therefore. Said judgment shall be 
augmented by the Petitioner's costs and attorney fees incurred 
after trial and in the collection of the judgments and enforcement 
of the orders entered herein. 
DATED this 2 j day of November, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONQB^fiLE JAMES 
Fifth Judicial District Court 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND MAILING 
4 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this nt day of November, 2005, I served upon and mailed, postage prepaid and by first class 
mail, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order and Judgments 
to Gary G. Kuhlmann, Attorney for Respondent, at 113 East 200 
North, Suite 1, Post Office Box 910387, St. George, Utah 84791. 
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ANDREW B. BERRY, JR. USB #030 9 
Attorney for Judith Wanda Lowry 
39 West Main Street 
Post Office Box 600 
Moroni, Utah 84646-0600 
Telephone: 435 436-8200 
IN THE FIFTH" JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
. .JUDITH WANDA LOWRY, • : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Petitioner, : 
vs. : Civil No. 044500246 
KENNETH RAY LOWRY, : Assigned to: 
Honorable James L. Shumate • 
Respondent. : 
ooOoo 
This action came on for a regularly scheduled trial on 
the 1st day of March, 2005, before the Honorable- James L. Shumate, 
of the Fifth Judicial District Court for Washington County within 
the State of Utah. The Petitioner and the Respondent were present 
and represented by their counsel, Andrew B. Berry, Jr., and Gary G. 
Kuhlmann, respectively. The parties presented their documentary 
evidence and witnesses and the Court examined the Petitioner and 
the Respondent. The Petitioner and the Respondent each presented 
proposed findings of fact, orders and judgments to the Court and 
$* 
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1 
filed objections thereto. THE COURT, upon the pleadings on file 
herein, the witnesses and documentary evidence presented by the 
parties and with good cause appearing therefore, now makes and 
enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. * The Petitioner and the Respondent were residents of 
the County of Washington within the State of Utah for three (3), 
months prior to the commencement of this action. 
2. The Petitioner and the Respondent were married on the 
20th day of August, 1960, in City of Dalton within the State of 
Massachusetts, and have been married in the LDS Temple and have 
since remained husband and wife, a period of nearly forty-three 
(43)., years. This is a marriage of long-term. 
3. The Respondent refused to give the Petitioner 
physical affection for several months prior to the parties'' 
separation and told the parties7 children he wanted a divorce from 
the Petitioner. There was insufficient evidence presented at trial 
to find that the Respondent was having an extra-marital affair. On 
March 12, 2004, two days after the Respondent had heart surgery, 
the Petitioner and the Respondent had an argument and the 
Petitioner was driving to Salt Lake to visit her children. The 
Petitioner called the Respondent and asked if she should return 
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home to work out the problem. The Respondent told the Petitioner 
to Mkeep going North and don't come home." The Respondent has told 
the Petitioner that he wants a divorce. The Petitioner did not 
want the divorce and requested the Respondent attend marriage 
counseling which he refused. Irreconcilable differences exist 
between the parties rendering this marriage no longer viable and 
making reconciliation impossible. 
. . . 4. • Four (4), children were born as issue of the 
Petitioner and the Respondent. All of said children are adults and 
are fully emancipated and are not dependent upon the parties for 
their support. 
•5. The Petitioner retired from the Shepard Montana 
School District in 1994. She receives retirement income from the 
State of Montana in the sum of One Hundred Eighty Dollars Seventy-
three Cents ($180.73), per month. The Petitioner also received 
Social Security income at the time of trial in the sum of Six 
Hundred Thirty-five Dollars ($635.00), per month, but this sum has 
since, been reduced by Seventy-three Dollars ($73.00), per month 
since trial and the Petitioner now receives social security income 
of Five Hundred Sixty-two ($562.00), per month. The Petitioner is 
completely disabled. She has had six (6), foot surgeries resulting 
from peripheral neuropathy, is in need of further surgeries and 
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suffers in continuous pain. The Petitioner has also had surgery 
fusing the vertebrae in her neck which causes the Petitioner 
continuous pain. The Petitioner suffers from arthritis and is in 
present need of cataract surgery. Becky Torgerson of the State of 
Utah Office of Rehabilitation assessed the Petitioner and 
determined that the Petitioner is disabled which prevents her from 
engaging in full-time gainful employment and it is highly 
questionable whether the Petitioner can engage in even part-time 
employment. Becky Torgerson was subpoenaed by the Petitioner to 
testify as to the Petitioner's complete disability but was released 
from the subpoena at trial because the parties stipulated that the 
Petitioner was completely' disabled. The Petitioner is receiving 
both physical therapy and other therapy, and the copay cost thereof 
is One Hundred Twenty Dollars ($120.00), per month. 
6. The Respondent receives Social Security income in 
excess of One Thousand Two Hundred Five Dollars ($1,205.00), per 
month. The Respondent deposited into the parties joint bank 
account funds from his retirement account and his social security 
from June, 2003, through April, 2004, the eleven (11), months prior 
to the parties' separation, in the sum of $42,265.35, which 
averages $3,842.30, per month. These deposits did not include his 
income from his employment at Century 21 Real Estate nor the 
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Petitioner's social security and retirement income. 
The Respondent deposited his income from Century 21, into 
the State Bank of Southern Utah during the parties marriage. On 
July 16, 2005, the Respondent testified that he had earned a 
commission of $27,600.00, on June 1, 2004, which he had deposited 
into his personal account at the State Bank of Southern Utah and 
that all of the funds in this account were his. The Respondent had 
also- deposited several thousand dollars in a separate account at 
Zions Bank. Paragraphs 5, and 7, of the Court's Order Arising from 
Order to Show Cause•Hearing refer to these accounts and ordered the 
division of these accounts reserved for trial and any amounts 
withdrawn therefrom offset against any other amount awarded at the 
time of trial. The Petitioner was paid a lump sum payment of Five 
Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), following the hearing upon the her 
order to show cause. 
In any event, the monies in the accounts were marital 
property having been earned by the Respondent during the marriage 
from commissions earned as a real estate agent at Century 21, where 
he had been employed since 2002. The Petitioner and the Respondent 
should each be awarded one-half {H) , of the value of the accounts 
at Southern Utah State Bank and Zions Bank and all other accounts 
existing at the time of the hearing upon the Order to Show Cause. 
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7. The Respondent has had heart surgery and has had 
stints placed in his heart and has other medical problems. The 
Respondent is presently employed as a real estate agent at Century 
21, in St. George, Utah. His adjusted gross income from his 1099, 
at Century 21 in the year 2.004, was Forty-seven Thousand Two 
Hundred Seventy-six Dollars Forty-three Cents ($47,276.43), 
although one of the commissions earned by the Respondent in the 
amount of Twenty-seven Thousand Six Hundred Dollars ($27,600.00), 
was an unusual event. The Respondent's average monthly income from 
Century 21, alone . for the • year 2004, was Three Thousand Nine 
Hundred Thirty-nine Dollars Seventy Cents ($.3,939.70). The Court 
finds that the Respondent's earning capacity is limited by his 
health status. 
The Respondent suffers from coronary and renal artery 
disease which bars him from full time work. If the Respondent 
could work full time his income would be Four Thousand Five Hundred 
Dollars ($4,500.00), per month. However, at the date of the 
Court's last hearing, November 1, 2005, the Respondent was only 
capable of part-time work. It is also very clear to the Court that 
the Respondent's health is in a changing status. The Court is 
unable to fix his earning capacity on a permanent basis due to his 
precarious state of health. At the present time the Court is 
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persuaded by the necessary burden of proof, that this Respondent is 
now able to earn Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00), per 
month. Because this is a temporary finding, either party may bring 
this issue back to the Court by motion, rather than by petition. 
8. The Petitioner's monthly living expenses are Three 
Thousand Three Hundred Four Dollars Eighty-nine Cents ($3,304.89), 
per month. Her monthly need for financial or spousal support from 
the Respondent (following the deduction of her monthly social 
security and retirement income in the sum of $742.73) is Two 
Thousand Four Hundred Eighty-nine Dollars Sixteen Cents 
($2,489.16), per month. 
The Respondent has no ability to pay said sum as spousal 
support from his income. The Petitioner is entitled to maintain 
the standard of living to which the parties have become accustomed 
because this is a long-term marriage. The Petitioner should be 
awarded temporary spousal support which should be paid by the 
Respondent in the sum One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00), per month 
on the 1st day of each month hereafter and said sum is to be paid 
from and after November 1, 2005, to the Petitioner by the 
Respondent. 
9. The Petitioner and the Respondent purchased a 
residence and real property in October, 2002, and during the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
marriage situate at 1020 East Fort Pierce Drive in the City of St. 
George in the County of Washington within the State- of Utah. The 
purchase price of the parties' home and real property was One 
Hundred Forty-nine Thousand Dollars ($149,000.00). U.S. Bank is 
owed Eighty-two Thousand Forty-two Dollars Seventy-one Cents 
($82,042.71), as of the date of trial and the payment thereon is 
Six Hundred Thirty-eight Dollars Ninety-one Cents ($638.91), per 
month. 
The Petitioner testified that the present fair market 
value of the marital'residence and real property at the time of 
trial was One Hundred Seventy-five Thousand Dollars ($175,000.00). 
On February 24, 2005, Craig Morley, a licensed, certified 
and accredited real estate appraiser of Morley & McConkie, L.C., 
performed an appraisal of the marital residence and real property. 
Mr. Morley was qualified as an expert witness as to the value of 
the parties7 residence and real property. Mr. Morley determined 
and testified that the fair market value of the parties7 residence 
and real property as of February 24, 2005, was One Hundred Eighty-
five Thousand Dollars ($185,000.00). Accordingly, the parties have 
just less than One Hundred Three Thousand Dollars ($103,000.00), of 
equity in the marital residence and real property. The Petitioner 
paid Eight Thousand Dollars ($8,000.00), from her separate 
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inherited funds toward the purchase of the marital residence and 
real property. 
The Petitioner should be awarded the ownership and all 
right, title and interest in and to said residence and real 
property subject only to the- Respondent's lien for his share of the 
equity therein in the sum of Forty-seven Thousand Five Hundred 
Dollars ($47,500.00). The Respondent shall forthwith quit claim 
the ownership and all right, title and interest in the. marital 
residence and real property to the Petitioner. The Petitioner 
shall pay the outstanding debt to'U.S. Bank on the residence and 
real property. The Petitioner needs to live in the residence 
because of her health problems and shall be entitled to live in the 
residence until she dies, or sells the marital residence and real 
property. The sale of the marital residence and real property 
should be in the Petitioner's sole discretion. The Petitioner 
shall not be required to pay the Respondent's lien upon the marital 
residence and real property until she sells the residence and real 
property, or re-marries. In the event the Petitioner chooses not 
to sell the residence and real property during her lifetime and the 
Respondent dies prior to the payment of his equity lien, said 
equity lien shall become an asset of the Respondent's estate. 
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10. The Respondent has in his possession marital 
property which he took with him at the time.of separation. These 
items include a refrigerator, television, chest of drawers, laptop 
computer, lounging chairs, a green desk, the barometer, a crystal 
chandelier, golf clubs, fishing gear, camping gear, 2 shop vacuums, 
saws, drills and several other tools, all purchased during the 
marriage. He also has weapons which were purchased during the 
marriage including-3 rifles, a'revolver' and reloading equipment. 
The Petitioner nor the Respondent made any claim for personal 
property in the possession.of the .other at the time of trial. The 
Petitioner and the Respondent acquired household furniture, 
fixtures, furnishings and appliances and other personal property 
during their marriage which have been divided between the parties 
and which should be awarded pursuant to this division except as 
otherwise ordered herein. 
11. Each party should be awarded his or her personal 
effects. 
12. The Respondent acquired pension, retirement and 
stock benefits during the parties' marriage which are presently 
held by American Funds. These funds have not yet been divided 
although the Petitioner's counsel has submitted a Domestic 
Relations Order for execution by the Court. The Respondent shall 
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forthwith execute all documents necessary to effectuate the 
division of all of the American Funds Accounts specifically, but 
not limited to, an IRA Distribution Request form provided to the 
Respondent's counsel by the Petitioner's counsel on January 4, 
2005, which requires the Respondent's signature guarantee in 
Section 7. The guaranteed signature of the Respondent is required 
before American Funds can distribute the Respondent's pension and 
retirement IRAs, and the Respondent shall do so forthwith. 
13. The Respondent deposited into a separate American 
Funds account approximately $32,045.00, which he claims he 
inherited from his father in 1999. The Respondent and the 
Petitioner created this account with American Funds in joint 
tenancy. Thereafter, the Respondent purchased a new GMC pickup 
truck with said funds from the joint American Funds account and 
this pickup truck was titled jointly with the Petitioner. The 
Respondent later sold the pickup truck and placed the proceeds of 
the sale into the American Funds account held in joint tenancy with 
the Petitioner. The Respondent also added a portion of his 
earnings during the marriage to this account during the marriage. 
The funds in this account have been commingled and have not 
remained the separate property of the Respondent. This American 
Funds account should be equally divided between the Respondent and 
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the Petitioner. 
14. In November 2003, the Respondent purchased a 2000 
GMC Extended Cab 4x4 pickup truck which he paid for in full. No 
loan obligation or other liens exist against this vehicle. The 
truck is titled in the names of the Respondent and the Petitioner. 
The present NADA value of this marital asset exceeds $22,000.00. 
The Respondent has also added a satellite radio, tool box, fancy 
wheels and running boards' to this' vehicle the value of which is 
$1,000.00. The value of"this marital asset should be divided 
equally between the Respondent and the Petitioner. 
15. The Petitioner purchased a 2002 Toyota Camry after 
the parties' separation because an accident, not the fault of the 
Petitioner, totaled the 1997 Cadillac DeVille driven by the 
Petitioner at the time of separation. This motor vehicle is titled 
solely in the Petitioner's name. The Petitioner owes nearly 
$7,000.00, to Box Elder Credit Union upon the 2002 Toyota Camry and 
her monthly payment thereon is $129.68, per month. The ownership 
and all right, title and interest in 2002 Toyota Camry, acquired 
after the parties' separation by the Petitioner, is awarded to her 
and she is ordered to pay the debt thereupon. 
16. The only debt of the parties is a GM credit card and 
the balance owed thereupon is $4,282.73. The credit card was used 
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during the marriage for family expenses such as bill payments, 
Christmas and birthday gifts, airline tickets and motel 
reservations. The Respondent should be ordered to pay the debt to 
the GM credit card in the above stated sum. 
17. The Petitioner has incurred costs and attorney fees 
herein in the- sum of Fifteen Thousand Two Hundred Fifty-seven 
Dollars Sixty-nine Cents ($15,257.69), through trial. The 
Petitioner borrowed Three Thousand Five Hundred • Dollars 
($3,500.00), from her son to pay a retainer to her counsel at the 
commencement of this action. The Petitioner's counsel submitted an 
Attorney's Affidavit specifying the services performed and the 
charges therefore. The attorney fees the Petitioner agreed to pay 
is $175.00 per hour plus the costs of the case. The hourly rate is 
reasonable in light of the circumstances of this case and the fees 
of other experienced lawyers in the community and the services 
performed for the Petitioner by her counsel were reasonable and 
necessary. The Petitioner does not have the ability to compensate 
her counsel and the Respondent has the ability to pay the 
Petitioner's costs and attorney fees from his employment and other 
income and other assets. The Respondent should be ordered to 
forthwith pay the Petitioner's costs and attorney fees incurred 
herein in the sum of $10,000.00, and the Petitioner is awarded 
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judgment against the Respondent therefore. 
THE COURT, having made and entered Findings of Fact now 
makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has both in personam and subject matter 
jurisdiction of the parties in this action. 
2. The Petitioner and the Respondent were married on the 
20th day of August, I960,' in City of Dalton within the State of 
Massachusetts, and have been married in the LDS Temple and have 
since remained husband and wife, a period of nearly forty-four 
(44), years. This is a marriage of long-term. 
3. Irreconcilable differences exist between the parties 
rendering this marriage no longer viable and making reconciliation 
impossible. The Petitioner should be awarded a divorce against the 
Respondent. 
4. Four (4), children were born as issue of the 
Petitioner and the Respondent. All of said children are adults and 
are fully emancipated and are not dependent upon the parties for 
their support. 
5. The Petitioner retired from the Shepard Montana 
School District in 1994. She receives retirement income from the 
State of Montana in the sum of One Hundred Eighty Dollars Seventy-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
three Cents ($180.73), per month. The Petitioner also receives 
Social Security income in the sum of Six Hundred Thirty-five 
Dollars ($635.00), per month at the time of trial. The 
Petitioner's social security income has been reduced by Seventy-
three Dollars ($73.00), since trial. The Petitioner is completely 
disabled and unable to engage in gainful employment. 
6. The Respondent receives Social Security income in 
excess of One Thousand Two Hundred Five Dollars ($1,205.00), per. 
month. The Respondent deposited into the parties joint bank 
account funds from his retirement account and social security from 
June, 2003, through April, 2004, the eleven (11), months prior to 
the parties' separation, in the sum of $42,265.35, which averages 
$3,842.30, per month. These deposits did not include his income 
from his employment at Century 21 Real Estate nor the Petitioner's 
social security and retirement income. 
The Respondent deposited his income from Century 21, into 
the State Bank of Southern Utah during the parties' marriage. On 
July 16, 2005, the Respondent testified that he had earned a 
commission of $27,600.00, on June 1, 2004, which he had deposited 
into his personal account at the State Bank of Southern Utah and 
that all of the funds in this account were his. The Respondent had 
also deposited several thousand dollars into a separate account at 
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Zions Bank. Paragraphs 5, and 7, of the Court's Order Arising from 
Order to Show Cause Hearing refer to these accounts and ordered the 
division of these accounts reserved for trial and any amounts 
withdrawn therefrom offset against any other amount awarded at the 
time of trial. 
In any event, the monies in the accounts were marital 
property having been earned by the Respondent during the marriage 
from commissions earned as a real estate agent at Century 21, where 
he had been employed since 2002. The Petitioner and the Respondent 
should each be awarded one-half (H) , of the value of the accounts 
existing at the time of the hearing upon the Order to Show Cause. 
7. The Respondent has had heart surgery and has had 
stints placed in his heart several years ago and has other medical 
problems. The Respondent is presently employed as a real estate 
agent at Century 21, in St. George, Utah. His adjusted gross 
income from his 1099, at Century 21 in the year 2004, was Forty-
seven Thousand Two Hundred Seventy-six Dollars Forty-three Cents 
($47,276.43), although Twenty-seven Thousand Six Hundred Dollars 
($27,600.00), of said sum was an unusual commission. The 
Respondent's average monthly income from Century 21, alone for the 
year 2004, was Three Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-nine Dollars 
Seventy Cents ($3,939.70). The Court concludes that the 
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Respondent's earning capacity is limited by his health status. 
The Respondent suffers from coronary and renal artery 
disease which bars him from full-time work. If the Respondent 
could work full time his income would be $4,500.00. However, at 
the date of the Court's last hearing, November 1, 2005, the 
Respondent was only capable of part-time work. It is also very 
clear to the Court that the Respondent's health is in a changing 
status. The Court is unable to fix his earning capacity on a 
permanent basis due to his precarious state of health. At the 
present time, the Court is persuaded by the" necessary burden of 
proof, that this Respondent is now able to earn $2,500.00, per 
month. Because this is a temporary finding, either party may bring 
this issue back to the Court by motion, rather than by Petition. 
8. The Petitioner's monthly living expenses are Three 
Thousand Three Hundred Four Dollars Eighty-nine Cents ($3,304.89), 
per month. Her monthly need for financial or spousal support from 
the Respondent (following the deduction of her monthly social 
security and retirement income in the sum of $742.73) is Two 
Thousand Four Hundred Eighty-nine Dollars Sixteen Cents 
($2,489.16), per month. 
The Respondent has no ability to pay said sum as spousal 
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support from his income. The Petitioner is entitled to maintain 
the standard of living to which the parties have become accustomed 
because this is a long-term marriage. The Petitioner should be 
awarded temporary spousal support which should be paid by the 
Respondent in the sum of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00), per 
month on the 1st day of each month hereafter and said sum should be 
paid by the Respondent to the Petitioner from and after November 1, 
2005, the date of the trial of this action. 
9. The Respondent deposited his income from Century 21, 
into the State Bank of Southern Utah during the parties marriage. 
On July 16, 2005, the Respondent testified that he had earned a 
commission of $27,600.00, on June 1, 2004, which he had deposited 
into his personal account at the State Bank of Southern Utah and 
that all of the funds in this account were his. The Respondent had 
also deposited several thousand dollars in a separate account at 
Zions Bank. Paragraphs 5, and 7, of the Court's Order Arising from 
Order to Show Cause Hearing refer to these accounts and ordered the 
division of these accounts reserved for trial and any amounts 
withdrawn therefrom offset against any other amount awarded at the 
time of trial. The Petitioner received a lump sum payment of Five 
Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), following the hearing upon her order 
to show cause. In any event, the monies in the accounts were 
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marital property having been earned by the Respondent during the 
marriage from commissions earned as a real estate agent at Century 
21, where he had been employed since 2002. The Petitioner and the 
Respondent should each be awarded one-half (^ ), of the value of the 
accounts at Southern Utah State Bank and .Zions Bank and all other 
accounts existing at the time of the hearing upon the Order to Show 
Cause. The Respondent should forthwith pay the Petitioner said 
sums and she should be awarded a judgment against the Respondent 
therefore. 
10. The Petitioner- and the Respondent purchased a 
residence and real property in October, 2002, and during the 
marriage situate at 1020 East Fort Pierce Drive in the City of St. 
George in the County of Washington within the State of Utah. The 
purchase price of the parties' home and real property was One 
Hundred Forty-nine Thousand Dollars ($149,000.00). U.S. Bank is 
owed Eighty-two Thousand Forty-two Dollars Seventy-one Cents 
($82,042.71), as of the date of trial- and the payment thereon is 
Six Hundred Thirty-eight Dollars Ninety-one Cents ($638.91), per 
month. 
The fair market value of the parties7 residence and real 
property as of February 24, 2005, was One Hundred Eighty-five 
Thousand Dollars ($185,000.00). Accordingly, the parties have just 
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less than One Hundred Three Thousand Dollars ($103,000.00), of 
equity in the marital residence and real property. The Petitioner 
paid Eight Thousand Dollars ($8,000.00), from her separate 
inherited funds toward the purchase of the marital residence and 
- real property. 
The Petitioner should be awarded the ownership and all 
right, title and interest in and to said residence and real 
property subject to the Respondent's lien for his share of the 
equity therein in the sum of Forty-seven Thousand Five Hundred 
Dollars ($47,500.00). The Petitioner shall pay the payments and 
debt to U.S. Bank upon the residence and real property. The 
Respondent should forthwith quit claim the ownership and all right, 
title and interest therein to the Petitioner. The Petitioner 
should be entitled to reside in the marital residence and real 
property until she dies, or until the home and real property are 
sold. The sale of the marital residence and real property shall be 
in the Petitioner's sole discretion. The Petitioner shall not be 
required to pay the Respondent's lien until such time as she sells 
the marital residence and real property, or re-marries. In the 
event that the Petitioner chooses not to sell the residence and 
real property and the Respondent dies before his equity lien is 
paid to him, said equity lien shall become an asset of the 
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Respondent's estate. 
11. The Respondent has in his possession marital 
property which he took with him at the time of separation. These 
items include a refrigerator, television, chest of drawers, laptop 
computer, lounging chairs, a green desk, the barometer, a crystal 
chandelier, golf clubs, fishing gear, camping gear, 2 shop vacuums, 
saws, drills and several other tools, all purchased during the 
marriage. He also' has weapons which were purchased during the 
marriage including 3 rifles, a revolver and reloading equipment. 
The Petitioner nor the •Respondent made• any claim for 
personal property in the possession of the other at the time of 
trial. The Petitioner and the Respondent acquired household 
furniture, fixtures, furnishings and appliances and other personal 
property during their marriage which have been divided between the 
parties and which should be awarded pursuant to this division. 
12. Each party should be awarded his or her personal 
effects. 
13. The Respondent acquired pension, retirement and 
stock benefits during the parties' marriage which are presently 
held by American Funds. These funds have not yet been divided 
although the Petitioner's counsel has submitted a Domestic 
Relations Order for execution by the Court. The Respondent should 
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forthwith execute all documents necessary to effectuate the 
division of all of the American Funds Accounts specifically, but 
not limited to an IRA Distribution Request form provided to the 
Respondent's counsel by the Petitioner's counsel on January 4, 
2005, which requires the Respondent's signature guarantee in 
Section 7. The guaranteed signature of the Respondent is required 
before American Funds can distribute the Respondent's pension and 
retirement IRAs. 
14. The Respondent deposited into a separate American 
•Funds account approximately $32,045.00, which he inherited from his 
father in 1999. The Respondent and the Petitioner created this 
account with American Funds in joint tenancy. Thereafter, the 
Respondent purchased a new GMC pickup truck with said funds from 
the joint American Funds account and this pickup truck was titled 
jointly with the Petitioner. The Respondent later sold the pickup 
truck and placed the proceeds of the sale into the American Funds 
account held in joint tenancy with the Petitioner. The Respondent 
then purchased the 2000 GMC pickup truck referred to below and 
titled this vehicle in the parties' names jointly. The Respondent 
also added a portion of his earnings during the marriage to this 
account during the marriage. The funds in this account have been 
commingled and have not remained the separate property of the 
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Respondent. The American Funds accounts are marital property and 
should be equally divided between the Respondent and the 
Petitioner. A qualified domestic relations order should issue to 
effectuate the division of all retirement, pension, IRA, and other 
.accounts. 
15. In November 2003, the Respondent purchased a 2000 
GMC Extended Cab 4x4 pickup truck which he paid for in full. No 
loan obligation or other liens exist against this vehicle. The 
truck is titled in the names of the Respondent and the Petitioner. 
The present NADA value of this marital asset exceeds $22,000. The 
Respondent has also added a satellite radio, tool box, fancy wheels 
and running boards to this vehicle the value of which is $1,000.00. 
The value of the equity in this marital asset should be divided 
equally between the Respondent and the Petitioner. 
16. The Petitioner purchased a 2002 Toyota Camry after 
the parties' separation because an accident, not the fault of the 
Petitioner, totaled the 1997 Cadillac DeVille driven by the 
Petitioner at the time of separation. This motor vehicle is titled 
solely in the Petitioner's name. The Petitioner owes nearly 
$7,000.00, to Box Elder Credit Union upon the 2002 Toyota Camry and 
her monthly payment thereon is $12 9.68, per month. The ownership 
and all right, title and interest in 2002 Toyota Camry, acquired 
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after the parties7 separation by the Petitioner is awarded to her 
and she is ordered to pay the debt thereupon. 
17. The only debt of the parties is a GM credit card and 
the balance owed thereupon is $4,282.73. The credit card was used 
during the marriage for family expenses such as bill payments, 
Christmas and birthday gifts, airline tickets and motel 
reservations. The Respondent should be ordered to pay the debt to 
the GM credit card in the above stated sum; 
18. The Petitioner has incurred costs and attorney fees 
herein in the sum of Fifteen Thousand Two' Hundred' Fifty-seven 
Dollars Sixty-nine Cents ($15,257.69), through trial. The 
Petitioner borrowed Three Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($3,500.00), from her son to pay a retainer to her counsel at the 
commencement of this action. The Petitioner's counsel submitted an 
Attorney's Affidavit specifying the services performed and the 
charges therefore. The attorney fees the Petitioner agreed to pay 
is $175.00 per hour plus the costs of the case. 
The hourly rate is reasonable in light of the 
circumstances of this case and the fees of other experienced 
lawyers in the community and the services performed for the 
Petitioner by her counsel were reasonable and necessary. The 
Petitioner does not have the ability to compensate her counsel and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the Respondent has the ability to pay the Petitioner's costs and 
attorney fees from his employment and other income and assets. 
The Respondent should be ordered to pay the Petitioner's 
costs and attorney fees incurred herein in the sum of $107000.00, 
and the Petitioner should be awarded judgment against the 
Respondent therefore augmented by the costs and attorney fees 
incurred in the collection of the judgments entered herein. 
DATED this QJ day of November",' 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE JAMES L.. SHUT^ATE, 
Fifth Judicial District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of November, 
2005, I served upon and mailed, postage prepaid and by first class 
mail, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law to Gary G. Kuhlmann, Attorney for Respondent, at 
113 East 200 North, Suite 1, Post Office Box 910387, St. George, 
Utah 84791. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the \ ^ day of July, 2006,1 did mail a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing: APPELLANT'S BRIEF to the following: 
Andrew Berry, Jr, 
P.O. Box 600 
39 West Main Street 
Moroni, Utah 84646-0600 
( l(UActAUn'fcto 
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